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— This research project reveals various issues 
一 — concerning corporate takeovers in Hong Kong. A 
detailed examination of a takeover case happened 
in 1987 is served as an illustrative medium. 
Emphasis will be on investigating the cost, risk 
and benefits of corporate takeovers from the 
points of view of raiders, defenders and 
shareholders, as well as the effect on economy as 
a whole. Other implications of takeovers on 
operational, legal and control areas will also be 
discussed. International dimensions are 
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Corporate takeover is not new in Hong Kong, but the 
number of takeover cases only becomes substantial in recent 
years. Meanwhile, hostile takeovers were almost unheard of 
until 1987I, mainly because in the past, most of the 
companies in Hong Kong were family owned, but traditionally 
the Chinese did consider it is an offence to raid other's 
business, and the one who lost his business to 'a raider 
also lost his face. 
When Hong Kong ‘ s companies grow bigger and more 
diversified in "their business, or* even becoine miilti-
nationalized, the management learn that to takeover other 
companies is a brand new strategy to obtain commercial, 一 
financial or customised benefits. Through takeovers and 
mergers, one could protect himself against hostile bids, 
since a company becomes more difficult to be swallowed as 
it grows bigger. 
Therefore it is important for management to realize 
the intrinsic meanings of takeovers and the effects brought 
about by takeovers. While to identify takeover targets as 
t 
1 Christopher Marchand, "Anatomy of a Corporate Raid." 
2 
well as to avoid being raided becomes two unavoidable new 
tasks for today's executives. 
Takeover bids usually lead to fluctuation of share 
prices； temporary suspension of trading of concerned 
companies* stocks; and change of control, management style, 
profitability and credit rating of the related companies. 
Takeover bids may even involve insider trading. Thus, from 
the stand point of small shareholders of companies, 
corporate takeovers to certain extent affect their 
interests. 
Whether acquisitions are good or bad to economy as a 
whole is still a controversial issue. This paper gathers 
different proposing and. opposing sirgunients and. tries to 
look into the problem as a regulator of market, from which 
would lead to a review of the current control measures of 
t a k e o v e r s . 
This paper begins with the relevant statistics of 
takeover bids in Hong Kong. Then a takeover case which 
happened in 1987 will be discussed in details, in which 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotels was a battle field. The 
course of the case brought out various issues of takeovers 
such as the use, value and power of the Hong Kong Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers； the motive, cost and risk involved 
in takeovers; the small shareholders‘ interest and other 
legal concerns. 
Subsequently, typical takeover procedures and 
strategies used by raiders and defenders will be 
I 
introduced, followed by the investigation of various 
3 
effects of acquisitions on economy. Then current control of 
mergers and acquisitions will be revealed, while 
recommendations will be given for future control measures. 
Finally, the paper will discuss about the role of market 
participants and future trends concerning corporate 
takeovers. 





Primary information and data are obtained in 
interviews with Li Kar Keung, Caspar, director of Citicorp; 
Francis H . Jackson, director of Schroders Asia Limited; and 
in the Reference Library of The Stock Exchange of Hong 
K o n g . Other secondary information is collected from 
articles in magazines, journals and newspapers. Text books 
are also referred. -
This paper aims at consolidating and integrating all 
information in a qualitative manner. It tries to bring out 
the issues arose from corporate takeovers, and tries to 
examine them one by one and all as a whole, in order to 
give a clear picture of takeovers on both micro and macro 
b a s i s . 
This paper also focus on identifying possible 
operational and legal problems associated with takeovers, 





United States, with one of the most active mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) market in the world, had 286 public 
companies acquired in 1987, while 1,550 private companies 
were acquired in the same year. The average size of the 
deals was from US$37.9 million for free—standing companies, 
to US$50 million for public companies . Although relatively. 
Hong Kong has a much smaller M&A market, Hong Kong's market 
can be considered as an active one. 
Exhibit One shows that, throughout the last four 
years, the number of corporate takeovers that involved Hong 
Kong‘s listed companies reached the maximum in 1987, a 
total of twenty five cases, then the figure dropped 
— --- — - • …. . -
gradually toward 1989. 
Other activity levels of the stock market are also 
presented in Exhibit One to see whether they are co-
related . T h e maximum activity levels of reorganisation, 
merger and demergers； new listing; and equity issues all 
occurred in 1987 or 1988, then followed by a drop in 1989. 
2 Anonymous, "The Tip of the M&A Iceberg." 
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The turnaround point may mainly due to the June 4 
massacre that led to a confidence crisis in Hong Kong. But 
the effects of political unrest on corporate takeovers 
cannot be wholly revealed by the figures, because- they 
exclude cross border transactions and takeovers of private 
companies. We will examine the long term consequences of 
political unrest in the last chapter with more d e t a i l s . 
EXHIBIT 1 
ACTIVITY LEVELS OF TAKEOVER AND OTHER RELEVANT STATISTICS 
YEAR 1986 1987 1988 1989 
NO. OF 21 25 19 15 
SUCCESSFUL * 
TENDER OFFER 
NO. OF LAPSEQ 0 1 4 4 
TENDER OFFER 
SUCCESS RATE 100% 96% 83% “ 79% 
OF TENDER 
OFFER 





NO. OF NEW 9 18 19 7 
LISTED 
COMPANY — 




� The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd., Fact Book, 1986-88. Raw data 1989. 
Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly, Feb 1990. 
Although there is no official statistics about the 
number of hostile takeovers, both spokesmen of both 
Citicorp and Schroders said that it should be r a r e . For 
tender offer cases, the success rates were decreasing but 
t 
still can be considered as high. The down going trend of 
7 
success rate does not mean anything, since there should be 
unique reason of failure in each case. 
According to foreign statistics, acquirers have less 
than 50% chance- of success in merger and acquisitions• in 
United States, the success rate for all tenders was 72.2 
percent in 1986, the success rate for uncontested tenders 
was nearly 95 percent, and no contested bids succeeded, 
while over 90 percent of hostile offers failed^. 
The targets in the corporate takeover cases are 
classified into nine major sectors as shown in Exhibit Two. 
The classification itself is not rigid, but it clearly 
shows that, a substantial percentage of takeover cases 
involved "land and property" companies within the period. 
It was partly because the sector itself represented a large 
portion of the total listed companies. Moreover, the 
property market has been booming during the last few years. 
Another major sector that takeovers took place was 
"banking and investment.“ A closer look of the information 
- - - - - - - • . . -
reveals that actually most of them were investment 
companies, only two out of the thirteen cases in which 
banks were the targets. Moreover, a significant number of 
takeovers involved "conglomerate" and "manufacturing" 
companies. 
/ 3 pappanastos, John S.； Hillman, Lisa T.; Cole, Peter 
A . , "The Human Resource Side of Mergers.“ 
4 Austin, Douglas V., "Tender Offer Update: 1987.” 
8 
EXHIBIT 2 
CLASSIFICATION OF TAKEOVERS BY BUSINESS 
YEAR 1986 1987 1988 1989 
BANKING & 3 5 4 1 
INVESTMENT 
CONGLOMERATE 1 4 3 2 
MANUFACTURING 2 3 2 2 
COMMERCIAL & 2 0 1 0 
RETAILING -
GOD OWN & " 1 1 0 0 
TRAN-
SPORTATION 
PUBLISHING & 1 2 0 0 
BROADCASTING 
HOTEL AND 1 0 3 0 
RESTAURANT 
PUBLIC 0 0 0 0 
UTILITIES 
LAND & 10 10 6 10 
PROPERTY 
TOTAL: ^ ^ 19 . 15 
Note: Classification is based on that in Hong Kong Economic Journal for currently Listed 
companies, others are classified by the writer. 
There was no takeover case involved public utility 
company in the last four years. Meanwhile, the non-
electricity related interests of Hong Kong Electric 
Holdings Ltd. was transferred to Cavendish International 
Holding Ltd. under a re-organisation plan in March 198 7; 
while in December of the same year, Hong Kong Telephone Co. 
Ltd. and Cable and Wireless Ltd. were merged and became 
wholly subsidiaries of Hong Kong Telecommunications Ltd^. 
The summary of tender offers in 1989 is shown in 
Appendix One. Since the data involved private or foreign 
5 The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. , Fact Book, 
1987. 
9 
companies is not available, the figures provided only shows 
part of the picture. 
I 
10 
- CHAPTER IV 
CASE STUDY - HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI HOTELS 
Introduction 
It was in the year 1987, when Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Hotels became the hostile takeover target of a young 
entrepreneur, Joseph Lau Luen Hung, the Chairman of Evergo 
Industrial. The case was by that time a hot topic as it was 
one of the very few hostile takeovers launched in Hong 
K o n g . It also prompted management to think about" the real 
meanings behind corporate takeovers: What are the motives 
of takeovers? What will be the gain or loss in takeovers? 
W h a t tactics should be used in attack and defence? What 
threats and opportunities emerge under the new 
circumstances? On the other hand, the case raised question - -- -- - -  - _ 
of whether the Code on Takeovers and Mergers had sufficient 
administrative and legal power. 
Background of the Target 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotel (HK Hotels) became a 
listed company in 1964. It had been running by the Kadoorie 
family, which was led by Lord Lawrence, the head of the 
family, and Michael Kadoorie, the male heir, totally held 
2 0 percent of the company. 
11 
In the year 1986, HK Hotels had a yearly turnover of 
HK$721 million and an operating profit of HK$242 million. 
The major assets were Peninsula Hotel, Kowloon Hotel, 
Repulse Bay properties, Peak Tramways Company Ltd. and 
other non-hotel restaurants. Adding a total book value of 
HK$1.09 billion. The major contribution before taxes and 
interests came from the hotels business which accounted for 
about 60 percent®. 
Just before the takeover started, there were 100 
million shares outstanding, trading at HK$41 to HK$50 per 
share in February 1987^. 
The Raider 
Joseph Lau, then 37-year-old controlled the‘one man 
empire with the flagship Evergo Industrial Enterprise, the 
major subsidiaries were Chinese Estates, China 
Entertainment, Paul Y. Construction and "NEWCO". 
Joseph Lau was described as: 
"Aggressive, anti-establishment super-trader. 
Amassed wealth by trading, speculating, and 
raiding."8 
The Scenario of Takeover 
Initiation 
6 The Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotels, Limited, Annual 
R e p o r t , 1987. 
7 Monthly Statistics of the Stock Exchange of Hong 
K o n g . 
11 Christopher Marchand, "Anatomy of a Corporate Raid." 
12 
The incident began with the selling of 3 0% stake of 
the HK Hotels by David Liang, the ex-chairman, to Joseph 
and Peter Lam Kin Ngok on March 2, 1987. Joseph paid 
HK$1.06 billion on behalf of China Entertainment at HK$53 
per share for the 20 percent stake, while Peter paid HK$53 0 
million on behalf of Lai Sun Development for the remaining 
10 percent shares at the same price per share. Both 
companies stated that the buying of HK Hotels‘ shares was 
a long term investment. Joseph also said that his company ‘ s 
strategy was to buy some undervalued assets, not necessary 
to divert to hotel business. 
The market speculated an anti-takeover strike back 
might sooner be launched by the Kadoorie family, thus the 
share price of HK Hotels was pushed up to HK$62 i-n the day-
after the transaction day, which was twelve dollars higher 
than the previous day's closing price of HK$50, or nine 
dollars higher than the bid price of Joseph and Peter. 
—一 Fighting for Control 
In order to exert influence on the board of HK Hotels, 
Joseph had to buy more shares from the open market, 
however, the Kadoorie family did not want to lose its 
control brought in the market at the same time. 
On May 4, 1987, in the morning of the annual 
shareholders meeting, Joseph finally decided to compete 
directly to the Kadoorie family, and he wanted to vote 
against the re-election of Michael Kadoorie as the chairman 
I 
of the board in the meeting. 
“ 13 
By that time, Joseph had built up his stake to 34.99 
percent, just below the trigger point for a general offer 
under the Hong Kong Code of Takeovers and Mergers. The 
average bid price of his shares was HK$72^ excluding those 
brought from David, but actually he had brought shares at 
price up to HK$80. The Kadoories were holding 30% by the 
time of the meeting. 
Climax - The Annual Shareholders Meeting 
On May 4, 1987, Michael won with 43.5 percent to 41.3 
percent against. Although one week later, the auditor Peat, 
Marwick & Mitchell declared that they had double counted 
one million votes for Michael, the result did not make any 
different. 
Trigger Point - 35% 
According to the Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers, General Principle (3): 
"When control of a company is acquired, it is 
normally required that, as soon as practicable 
thereafter, the controlling shareholder(s) should 
extend to other shareholders of the same class an 
offer on terms no less attractive than the 
highest price paid for shares purchased by the 
controlling shareholder(s) within the six months 
prior to acquiring control..." 
Where "control" is defined in the Code as: 
" . . . a holding, or aggregate holdings, of shares 
carrying 35% or more of the voting rights of a 
company, irrespective of whether that holding or 
holdings gives de facto control.” 
9 Christopher Marchand, "Anatomy of a Corporate Raid." 
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Based on the Code on Takeovers and M e r g e r s , Kadoories 
were ready to strike back by first reporting to the 
Committee on Takeovers and Mergers that Joseph and Peter 
were acting in concert. Thus they were liable to make a 
general offer at a price not less than the maximuin bid 
price of their shares. 
"Acting in concert" is defined in the Code as: 
"Persons acting in concert comprise persons w h o , 
pursuant to an agreement or understanding 
(whether formal or informal) , actively co-
operate, through the acquisition by any of them 
of securities in a company, to obtain or 
consolidate control of that company...” 
If the Committee believed that was the case, Joseph 
and Peter had to prepare HK$4.4 billion more for a general 
offer, or they had to reduce their holding of shares to 
less than 35 percent. The latter case was what the 
Kadoories w a n t e d� 
In the forty-page report submitted by East Asia 
W a r b u r g , the financial advisor of HK H o t e l s , five reasons 
were given, explaining why China Entertainment and Lai Sun 
were acting in concert^°: ‘ “ - “ 
, 1. David Liang had sold his 30% shareholding 一 
20% to China Entertainment and 10% to Lai 
Sun - at the same price, on the same day, 
and on the same terms. 
2. Prior to the sale, Mr Liang, his agents and 
the purchasers were connected by social or 
professional relationships. 
3. The share purchases by China Entertainment 
and Lidi Sun were disproportionate to the 
size of the respective companies. In Lai 
Sun's case, they were also inconsistent with 
its normal business activity. 
I 
South China Morning Post, June 23, 1987. 
15 
- . 
4. Both companies had also voted against 
Michael Kadoorie‘s re-election at the annual 
meeting on May 4. 
5. China Entertainment‘s purchase of further 
shares was also explainable only if it knew 
of Lai Sun's purchase of 10% of Hotel's 
shares, and the two shared motives. 
However, David Liang,- his friend, Lawrence Yu, and his 
solicitor, Philip Kan refused to appear before the 
Coimittee of Takeovers and Mergers to give verbal evidence. 
And finally, without supporting evidences, the Committee 
concluded that "the actions of China Entertainment and Lai 
Sun were consistent with their claims of having independent 
objectives with respect to their holdings in Hotels," so 
the parties did not have to give a general offer. 
Settle Down 
Then Kadoories had considered that by means of 
takeover of China Entertainment through HK Hotels, they 
could regain HK Hotels' control. They were too late to do 
so, the proposal was turned down because China --• - -
Entertainment had already got too much HK Hotels shares, 
buying China Entertainment was effectively a share 
repurchase by HK Hotels which was forbidden by the 
Securities and Futures Commission. Moreover, according to 
Companies Ordinance c.32 s.28A.(1), "... a body corporate 
cannot be a member of a company which is its holding 
company...." Thus, HK Hotels could not hold China 
Entertainment, which was its member, under the ordinance. 
In July 1987, Kadoories‘ financial advisor, Schroders 
16 
Asia, arranged the purchase of 25.7 percent HK Hotels 
shares from Evergo group by a group of six financial 
institutions. Kincross, a newly formed company, represented 
these six institutions^ in the transaction. Besides, TKM, 
a wholly owned subsidiary of Hong Kong Bank would buy the 
remaining 9.3 percent HK Hotels shares from Evergo group. 
The total value of the two deals amount to HK$2.2 
billion, equivalent to HK$65 per share on average. And 
Evergo group could earn a profit of $136 million at the end 
of the day. 
In fact, International Trade and Investment Co. (ITI), 
a company effectively controlled by Kadoorie family, had 
entered into an option agreement with both Kincross and 
TKM, which enabled it to buy all their HK Hotels shares at 
any time before October 30, 1987, or ITI could required 
Kincross and TKM to sell the shares to I T I � s nominees, but 
ITI had to bear any loss if the shares were sold at less 
than HK$65 each. 
The Committee of Takeovers and Mergers s a � d -that the — 
Kadoorie family was not acting in concert with Kincross and 
TKM, and it did not need to launch a general offer unless 
it had brought the shares from Kincross and TKM. 
These share were later sold at $61.5 to $61.75 each in 
Hong Kong and overseas, leaving Kadoories with a loss of 
Hang Seng Bank, Bank of East Asia, Schroders Asia 
Ltd., French Nyon Trust Ltd., British Milan Finance (H.K.) 
Ltd., Man Dat Kee (H.K. ) Ltd. . (Translated names for the 
last three companies.) 
17 
HK$100 millioni2. 
Lai Sun's 10 percent HK Hotels shares were sold in the 
market before the Black Monday. 
A Review of the Issues 
Why Did This Takeover Take Place? 
It began with the major shareholder of HK Hotels, 
David Liang, selling his stake to Joseph Lau and Peter Lam. 
The writer of "Anatomy of a Corporate Raid," Christopher 
Marchand, suggested that Liang‘s action was due to his 
failure to persuade the Kadoories to expand the company 
more aggressively. But Liang was the Chairman of the board 
and he actually had more shares than the Kadoories did by 
that time, thus insufficient voice on the board seems not 
the true reason for Liang to leave. Maybe he found the 
HK$3.5 premium per share (compared with the closing price 
at February 27, 1987) offered by Joseph and Peter which 
represented a profit of HK$104 million was really 
attractive. 
Investors of stock market were much more interested in 
the raider‘s motive. Despite Joseph‘s declaration of long 
term investment at the very beginning. Christopher Marchand 
suggested that Joseph was looking for "quality, income-
generating assets which could be more efficiently 
utilised." In order words, he wanted to acquire under-
� 
17 Christopher Marchand, "Anatomy of a Corporate Raid." 
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utilised assets, then by means of better management and 
redevelopment, to improve the profitability of the assets; 
or he could greenmail^^ the Kadoorie family and got the 
quick money if they fought back. 
Asian Finance had polled a select group of bankers, 
businessmen, accountants, lawyers and independent 
observers, which revealed that, among the 14 returned 
questionnaires, 71.4% suspected greenmail in Joseph‘s rapid 
accumulation of HK Hotels shares. 71.4% believed he had no 
intension of long term investment. Moreover, 42.8% thought 
that the takeover bid arose because there was room to 
improve the holding company‘s profitability, and half of 
rhem thought the management of HK Hotels was deficiently. 
Although these results did not have any statistical 
significance, they provided some ideas of the perception of 
professionals about the case. 
It is believed that an asset would probably become a 
potential takeover target once it is identified as not 
properly managed, not fully utilized, or just simply 
undervalued. In this case, Evergo group brought HK Hotels 
shares at the overall average of HK$61 per share, which was 
below the fully valued price as suggested by 
analysts. Thus one motive of this acquisition should be 
13 A raider‘s practice of cornering a large proportion 
of a company's stock to force management to buy the raider 
out at a higher price than her paid for his shares. 
‘ 14 Anonymous, "The Hotels Affair: Is Joseph Lau the 
Tough Raider He Looks?" 
15 Christopher Marchand, "Anatomy of a Corporate Raid.” 
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buying an undervalued asset. 
Strategy Used 
Lau ‘ s attack strategy was to move fast, he caught the 
Kadoories by surprise as he suddenly acquired 20 percent 
stake of the HK Hotels from Liang. 
While play for time was the anti-takeover strategy 
used by the Kadoories. At the beginning, the Kadoories 
refused to appoint representatives from China Entertainment 
and Lai Sun to the board, and that forced Lau to buy more 
shares in order to gain a voice at the annual shareholders 
meeting on May 4, 1987, and that was two months later. When 
Lau decided to pull out from the game and sold all his 
shares when he found himself unable to gain the control of 
HK Hotels, that was nearly another three months later. 
During the course of rapid shares accumulation, China 
Entertainment originally with HK$704 million cash balance, 
piled up its debt to HK$ 1 billion^®. Thus if Lau was going 
to greenmail the Kadoories and make quick profit, the 
longer time he took, the more interests on debt he had to 
pay, and the less profit he would made. 
So that maybe part of the reason why Lau accepted the 
placement arranged by the Kadoories with only HK$2 premium 
per share (the closing price on July 24, 1987, the day 
before the declaration of the deals, was HK$63). Remember 
that he had paid up to HK$3 premium per share for the 
I 
16 Christopher Marchand, "Anatomy of a Corporate Raid.“ 
I 香 港 中 文 大 學 圓 書 馆 藏 書 I 
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beginning 20 percent stake. 
In this case, we learn that debt seems not a good 
financing tool for hostile takeovers which usually require 
a deep pocket of money under long lasting fierce fight. 
Acting in Concert 
The Code on Takeovers and Mergers is supposed to 
protect the benefits of minority shareholders. Once a 
company‘s control is changed, the minority shareholders 
would be given the chance to sell their share, at a price 
not less than the maximum bid price of acquirer within the 
six months prior to the gain of control. But in the HK 
Hotels case, the purpose of the Code was much more than to 
protect the minority shareholders, it was actually used as 
an anti-takeover weapon. 
The Kadoories, by trying to prove China Entertainment 
and Lai Sun were acting in concert, hoped that Lau would be 
forced to sell at least part of his HK Hotels shares in 
order to avoid the general offer required by the Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers. However, this strategy did not work 
as the Committee of Takeovers and Mergers failed to prove 
the existence of acting in concert between Lau and Lam. 
There is no point to criticize the judgement made by 
the Committee on Takeovers and Mergers, but the Code itself 
certainly has room to be improved. For instance, whether 
the Committee of Takeovers and Mergers has been dedicated 
with sufficient power to administrate the Code； whether the 
I 
definitions in the Code are vague； whether the 3 5 percent 
21 
trigger point of general offer is appropriate； whether code 
is a suitable form of control. 
Reasons of Failure 
The vital point was that Lau was targeting at a family 
business, a business th—at: had been running by the Kadoories 
for more than 80 years. To the family, a defeat in the war 
of corporate takeover would not only mean a loss of 
control, but a serious loss of face. Thus the family would 
fight with full strength against the raider regardless of 
financial loss. 
On the other hand, when the takeover was prolonged, 
Lau did not have the contingency funding. His use of debt 
financing limited his playing time as the interest was 
piling up all the time. 
Slow decision making made Lau lose. Lau was too late 
to decide to vote against Michael in the annual 
shareholders meeting, as a result he was too late to 
reverse some proxy votes on shares that he had brought in 
the last minute, these shares actually voted for Michael in 
the annual shareholders meeting. 
Who Are the Winners 
David Liang who sold his 30 percent stake of HK Hotels 
at HK$53 per share received HK$1.59 billion in cash. 
Compared to the closing price HK$49.5 on the day before the 
selling, he made a profit of HK$104 million and can be 
considered as the first winner* in this takeover. 
22 
Peter Lam of Lai Sun who had sold his 10% stake just 
before the October crash should be able to gain about HK$10 
per share, a sum of HK$100 million, or a 20 percent return 
on this half-year investment. In fact he could earn even 
more if he sold his stake to either Lau or the Kadoories in 
'—April, just before the annual shareholders meeting. The 
stocks were trading in the range of HK$63.5 to HK$79 per 
share in April 1987. 
For the minority shareholders, all who sold their 
shares at prices higher than HK$65, the fully valued price 
suggested by analyst, gained in the takeover. But 
speculators who brought shares within the period, hoping to 
make profit in a general offer would be disappointed. 
Meanwhile shareholders who were long term investors 
benefited from the more aggressive management of HK Hotels 
after the incident. 
The raider, Lau, although failed to gain the control 
of HK Hotels had earned a handsome profit of HK$136 million 
for his Evergo empire. However, this "handsome" profit only 
means a not so glamorous return of about 6.5 percent. 
The Kadoorie family who won the battle still controls 
the HK Hotels, but the cost for the lesson was HKSlOO 
million as they underwrote Lau‘s shares at a loss. 
Stock brokers and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong had 
also gained from the increased trading volume of HK Hotels‘ 
stocks within the fighting period. 
I 
The HK Hotels Afterwards 
23 
HK Hotels announced that Mr. H.G. Webb-Peploe would be 
the new managing director with effective on November 9, 
1987. Mr. H. G, Webb-Peploe had 28 years of experience with 
the Royal“Dutch Shell Group of Companies^^. 
Several major projects were proposed in the interim 
report 1987: Two multi storey towers would be added to The 
Peninsula, which would double the number of rooms； Peak 
Tramways‘ properties would be redeveloped； while the 
tramway ‘ s operation would be rciodernized • 
A sub-division of the company‘s shares from one HK$2.5 
share to five HK$0.5 shares was also suggested in the 
report, aiming at an increase of marketability. The number 
of shareholders was expected to increase, and it would 
certainly increase the difficulty in accumulating shares 
from the market by any potential raider in the future. 
17 Ming Pao, July 4, 1987. 
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CHAPTER V 
‘— PROCEDURES OF TAKEOVERS 
Most corporate takeovers in Hong Kong are in the form 
of friendly acquisition, hostile takeovers are rare. For a 
friendly acquisition, the buying company contacts the 
selling company through its merchant banker or financial 
consultant. 
Francis H. Jackson, director of Schroders Asia Limited 
said that, part of the job of a financial consultant was to 
identify potential takeover targets for their clients, but 
in fact about 90 percent of the takeovers processed were 
proposed by the clients themselves. 
At the very beginning stage of a takeover, the 
financial consultant will first evaluate the target 
company‘s financial situation, such as its profitability, 
its current assets' value and its future prospect in order 
to estimate the value of the target company. Then by 
further considering any synergy value and goodwill that 
could be produced by takeover, and any hidden value not 
fully explored, the consultant should be able to set a 
ceiling bid for the buyer. But the values of synergy and 
goodwill are difficult to be determined according to 
Francis H . Jackson‘s commend. 
25 
It is also the responsibility for financial consultant 
to suggest the financing method for a takeover. Finally, 
when the buyer approves, the consultant can contact the 
target company. + 
For the target company, it also needs to appoint a 
financial consultant to evaluate the economic value of 
itself. Here, a bottom line has to be set for the selling 
p r i c e . 
If the target is a private company, the takeover deal 
can be closed once an agreement is reached by the two 
p a r t i e s . If the target company is a public one, the 
acquiring company can either purchase shares from target's 
major shareholders or through a launch of tender offer. In 
the latter case, the board of the target company is liable 
to advise its shareholders whether the offer is acceptable. 
In hostile corporate takeovers, the procedures would 
be the same, except there will be no negotiation between 
the two companies. The raider accumulates target company‘s 
shares through tender offer or by buying in the market. 
I 
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- CHAPTER VI 
COST, RISK AND BENEFITS IN CORPORATE"TAKEOVERS 
Cost 
Besides the funds needed in acquiring the shares of 
the target company, buyer's costs include the costs of 
financial consultant, the expenses on advertising of the 
transaction, and the printing cost of the tender offer 
documents. 
If the acquirer uses cash to buy the target company, 
it may either use the existing idle cash or employ debt 
financing. In the latter case, acquirer has to pay interest 
expenses. Tender offer can also be in the form of stocks 
exchange. Acquirer can use its common stocks or preference 
stocks to exchange for the target company‘s stocks. 
The seller's costs consist of financial consulting fee 
and advertising expenses. 
Risk 
Although an acquirer expects a long term benefits from 
the acquired company that worth more than he paid, there is 
risk associated with these long term benefits, because they 
may not be fully extracted. In fact, if a tender offer is 
failed or the acquired company‘s performance turns out to 
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be worse than expected after the takeover, besides 
financial loss, the buyer could also lose his reputation. 
While the seller in a takeover transaction has to take risk 
too, because he may have undervalued his company and sold 
his stake at a loss. 
Benefits 
Usually the acquirer is willing to pay a premium for 
the target company‘s shares in order to make the offer more 
attractive, but the bid price could be less than the 
economic value of the company, and this difference between 
bid price and economic price represent the gain of the 
acquirer. While sellers‘ gain is the premium over market 
price they received. 
In a hostile takeover, the raider has to accumulate 
shares in the market or through tender offer. The defender, 
usually the major shareholder of the target company will 
try hard to protect his control by using various anti-
takeover strategies. But no matter who wins the takeover 
battle, the minority shareholders of the target company 
often benefit by selling their stake at the appreciated 
price during the period of fight. 
I 
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- CHAPTER VII 
ATTACK AND DEFENSE STRATEGIES 
Private Company 
There is not much room to play with when dealing with 
a private target company, particularly when most of the 
shares capital is controlled by only a few people. Unless 
these shareholders really have an intension to sell, there 
is no way to pressure them. The only feasible strategy is 
through personal relations consultants, to convince the 
shareholders that the terms of offers are good. 
Nevertheless, whether the deal can be closed depends on the 
decision of these shareholders. 
Public Company 
Takeover Strategies 
Public Relations and Advertising 
In friendly takeovers, personal relations strategy is 
the key to success. Since the board of the target company 
is responsible to give comments to shareholders on the 
tender offer proposal. Thus to win the recommendation from 
I 
the board of the target company is the most important task 
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for the buyer's negotiator. If the buyer cannot win the 
recommendation, he may turn to a hostile takeover. 
The buyer can then make use of extensive advertising 
in newspapers. He has to explain to the shareholders of 
target company that they can enjoy a significant premium by 
accepting the ‘document, by showing them all supportive 
financial data. Public relations consultants can also be 
appointed to sell the tender offer proposal. 
Move Fast 
A hostile takeover can also be done by buying a 
substantial stake of the target company in the market or 
from the major shareholders without going through the 
negotiation stage, just as China Entertainment did in the 
HK Hotels case. A fast move can catch the defender by 




Active anti-takeover strategies are long term 
strategies that are used to prevent the company from being 
a target of takeover. 
a.) Keep Share Price High 
Since takeover targets are mostly undervalued 
companies, academicians suggest that, to avoid being 
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raided, management should keep the share price of their 
company as high as possible. 
In an efficient market, share price reflects the 
economic value of a company. But when some positive 
information of a company is missed by the market, investors 
may undervalued the company and the stock price then no 
longer represents the true value of it. And the company may 
be considered as cheap and attractive by potential raiders. 
Thus management is advised to disclose to public any 
relevant financial data and information that help evaluate 
the value of the company periodically, so that shareholders 
and other investors are able to attach a reasonable price 
tag to it, and market forces will keep the share price at 
the right level. 
b.) Stock Watch 
A stock watch system can be incorporated which 
1 P 
monitors any unusual trading activities. There was case in 
which the stock watcher noticed an odd trading p a t t e r n , the 
situation was reported to the client, and a major 
accumulation was then confirmed. The subsequent steps taken 
by the client successfully forced the raider to disengage. 
c.) Multiple-Vote Common Stock 
Multiple-vote common stock gives superior voting power 
to certain class of shareholder. These shares are held in 
/ 
18 Wines, Richard, "The Stock Watch System: Early 
Warning on Raiders.“ 
— 31 
friendly hands. Thus raiders cannot gain proportional 
voting right by accumulating normal common stocks^^. 
d.) Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) 
ESOPs is an effective barrier to takeovers. Employees 
are given shares or options of the company as_ part of the 
compensations. When a critical decision has to be made, 
such as a change of chairman of the board, they would 
probably vote for their own good. M o r e o v e r , under the 
p l a n s , employees get incentive to manage the firm more 
efficiently, this could increase the value o f the firm 
indirectly which help discourage raiding^^. 
e.) Golden Parachutes “ 
Another way to deter hostile takeovers is the 
incorporation of golden parachutes, which makes the company 
liable to pay a huge sum of money to senior executive when 
they are terminated as a result of takeover. Similar plans 
for middle management and other employees are called silver 
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parachutes and tin parachutes . 
Reactive Strategies 
When a hostile takeover has already started, short 
term strategies have to be used to keep the raider out as 
19 Anonymous, "The Takeover Defenses - Failsafe 
Protection.，， 
‘ 20 Avner Arbel and Robert H. Woods, "Shark Repellent: 
Anti-takeover Measures for the Hospitality Industry." 
21 � b i d . 
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soon as possible. 
a.) Anti-Trust Suit 
Filing an anti-trust suit against the raider can b u y 
the defender some time to prepare further anti—takeover 
steps, but it is only practicable in countries with anti— 
trust law22. 
In the HK Hotels case, the Kadoories made a similar 
move by bringing the case to the Committee of Takeovers and 
Mergers in order to buy themselves time. 
b.) Selling the Crown Jewels 
In order to make the defending company less 
attractive, it can sell out its major assets or arrange a 
substantial amount of debt that is due immediately under a 
change of control. It was found that just threatening to do 
so can cause the raider to abandon. 
c.) Pac-Man 
In the HK Hotels case, HK Hotels had tried to fight 
back by buying the raiding company‘s shares, however it was 
too late to do so. 
Nevertheless, purchasing a significant amount of the 
raiding company's shares puts the defender in a better 
position to negotiate. This so called Pac-Man defense 
^ Ibid. 
23 � b i d . 
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strategy was first used in 1982, in the battle between 
Martin Marietta and Bendix^"^. 
d.) Greenmail 
In the HK Hotels case, the final settlement was done 
with the underwriting of shares held by Evergo Group, in -
which any loss were bore by the Kadoories. It was 
effectively a greenmail agreement where the defender paid 
a premium for the stocks held by the raider and the raider 
retreated in return. This is the worst anti-takeover 
strategy, because it actually encourages raiding activities 
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“ CHAPTER VIII 
THE EFFECTS OF TAKEOVERS ON ECONOMY 
Whether takeovers are good to economy as a whole has 
been a controversial topic for academicians, market 
participants and market regulators. Both positive and 
negative effects of takeovers can be summarized in the 
following sections. 
Effects on Company and Management 
Proponents of takeovers suggest that the threat of 
being brought by another company make management more 
concern about the shareholder value maximizing objective, 
and as a result improves efficiency and effectiveness of 
running the business. While consumers are benefited from 
cheaper and better products and services available as a 
result of the improved management. 
On the other hand, undervalued or mismanaged companies 
would be brought by raiders who intended to extract long 
term profit from them by improving the utilization of 
resources and profitability of the companies. Thus 
takeovers are needed in free market, they could guarantee 
the efficient use of limited resources and are good to 
shareholders and customers. 
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But opponents of takeovers suggest that, there are 
also negative effects associated with takeovers. The change 
of top management may lead to a change of corporate 
culture, if the reasons of change are not fully explained 
to the employees, it could reduce the morale, productivity 
and employee commitment of the acquired companies, the 
employees may even leave the company. 
A study which used Census Bureau data was designed to 
find out if there were any changes in productivity of over 
19,000 manufacturing plants under changes of ownership in 
the period 1972 to 1981. The result showed that these 
plants had significantly lower levels of productivity 
before ownership change but with higher productivity after 
the change25. The decrease of productivity before' takeover 
might due to the loss of employees‘ confidence about their 
future. But when the deal was closed and everything became 
clear, employees regained their confidence, productivity 
rose to normal level or would even be improved. 
Another study revealed that in aggregate, there were 
few significant changes in the profitability, expanse 
levels, and asset use of the takeover targets after the 
transactions . The reasons might be, most acquiring 
companies were not looking for operational b e n e f i t s . In 
fact they were looking for financial benefits such as tax 
25 Lichtenberg, Frank, "Productivity Improvements from 
Changes in Ownership.“‘ 
26 Eyssell, Thomas H., "Partial Acquisitions and Firm 
Performance.” 
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shields and debt capacity. And maybe the management of the 
acquiring company overestimated their capability in running 
the target company's business. 
On the other hand, management of the acquiring company 
was accused of the use of short term oriented strategy that 
do not necessary benefit the company. Although in most of 
the time, the management people or the members of the board 
who arrange takeovers are also the major shareholders, They 
may act for their own interests at the expense of other 
shareholders ‘ . They may only look for reputation or 
compensation in takeovers. 
Effects on Stock Prices and Stock Market 
If the stock market is efficient, stock price of a 
company should reflect the true value of it. Therefore by 
analyzing the stock prices of the acquiring and target 
companies before and after a takeover, it should be able to 
see whether takeover could increase shareholder v a l u e . 
_ US studies indicate that the stocks of both acquiring 
and target companies will rise following a tender offer^^. 
W h i l e a study of 1,930 Canadian merger and acquisition bids 
made during the period 1964-1983 shows that, the 
transactions created significant gains to shareholders of 
both acquiring and target firms^®. 
Ginsburg, Douglas H.； Robinson, John F., "The Case 
Against Federal Intervention in the Market for Corporate 
Control.“ 
28 Eckbo, B. Espen, "Mergers and the M a r k e t for 
Corporate Control: The Canadian Evidence.“ 
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These findings may suggest that takeovers can create 
value for both acquiring and target companies, but this may 
also be the result of investors ‘ overestimation of the 
value created by takeovers. � 
When asked whether takeovers increase volatility and 
encourage speculation in stock market, Francis H . J a c k s o n , 
director of Schroders Asia Limited replied t h a t , the 
irelationship between takeovers and activity level in stock 
market was just in the other way round. He pointed out that 
it was the market and other environment factors on which 
takeovers depend, and takeovers were the result of market 
needs. 
Effect on Economy “ 
A US study revealed that takeovers and restructurings 
are good to US economy. In 1978-1987, takeovers had created 
US$400 billion in shareholder v a l u e . Some think that this 
money was a benefit to the economy because it was spent and 
, OQ 
circulated, jobs were created and taxes were paid . 
But an opposing view suggests that, since many 
takeovers are financed by debt provided by banks, buying 
the target company's shares is the same as replacing equity 
capital with debt capital. The risk of the acquiring 
companies increases when leverage increases, this also put 
29 Pickens, T . Boone； Trevor, Leigh, ‘ "The Great 
Takeover Debate - Say Yes, for Efficiency's Sake； V o t e No, 
Based on the Facts." 
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their banks in a riskier position . The aggregate result is 
an increasing leverage of the whole society. 
Moreover, when financial risk of companies increases, 
they become more short term orientated in choosing business 
strategies, long term opportunities may be foregone, and as 
a result the society suffers. _ 一 
Companies‘ bargaining power increases as they grow 
bigger under mergers and acquisitions, it is criticized 
that takeovers create monopolistic market in which the 
benefits of customers are squeezed by giant corporations. 
Effects on a Nation 
The effects of takeovers become much more complicated 
in cross-border transactions because a nation has to 
protect its own interest. From the world's perspective, 
there is no doubt about the efficient utilization of 
resources associated with takeovers. But as one country's 
company is brought by a foreign one, the long term 
opportunity cost is sold for short term profit. 
For instance, Japan has been acquiring high-technology 
companies in United States, as a result the future profits 
from the long term research and development projects held 
by these companies will go to Japan one day. 
If a cross border takeover concerns a defense related 
industry, it will not be an economic issue only, it will 
also be a political issue. 
> 
30 Rousseas, Stephen, "Can the U.S. Financial System 
Survive the Revolution?" 
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In a cross-border takeover transaction, the 
opportunity cost lost by one nation equals to the gain of 
another. But how much will the economy of one country be 
一 better off at the expense of the others, and whether it is 
a zero sum game remain the topics for further research. 
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_ CHAPTER IX 
CONTROL OF TAKEOVERS 
Why Control is Needed 
We have seen the effects of takeovers from different 
perspectives in the previous chapter, the affected parties 
could be grouped into three main categories: investors, 
general public and nations. 
Investors 
Shareholders or other investors like debt holders of 
companies have to protect themselves from any possible loss 
as a result of takeovers. This can be done by using tighter 
internal regulations or by means of contracts, to guarantee 
-their interests under any change of control of companies. 
For example, any change of member or chairman of board must 
be passed in a general shareholders meeting; any 
significant change of ownership must be disclosed,, debt 
holders must have the right to modify terms of lending 
under a change of control of the companies. 
But there are still problems associated with the 
diverted interest of shareholders. If the major 
shareholders launch or accept a takeover deal solely for 
their own benefit at the expenses of minor shareholders‘ 
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interest. Should external regulations be used? 
General Public 
As discussed in the previous chapter, mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) create more and more giant corporations 
with increasing monopolistic power. Consumers‘ benefits are 
squeezed as � h e i r bargaining power decreases. However 
consumers are not the one who make M&A decisions, they do 
not even have a voice in M&A decision making process. 
Therefore the protection of consumers‘ benefits becomes the 
responsibility of government. 
Nations 
Acquisition of companies by foreign countries, to 
certain extent does not like direct investment by foreign 
countries, in the later case new capital is introduced and 
new job opportunities are created. But when a company is 
acquired by foreign company, no new capital or new job 
opportunities are necessary brought in. Moreover, selling 
a company to foreigners also means selling the profit 
generating opportunities to foreigners, what should be 
earned by one country becomes the earnings of another. 
Furthermore a country also wants to prevent its high 
technology from being sold to others, particularly the 
technology in defense related industries. Thus a nation 
would need law and regulations to control cross border M&A 
activities. 
I 
For instance, United States is now drafting investment 
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regulations which implement the Exon-Florio provision on 
foreign investment. The aim is to prevent foreigners from 
gaining control of US business that are considered 
important to the nation ‘ s security^^. 
Control of Takeovers in Hong- Kong 
The Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
The Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the Code) 
is the only mean of control of takeovers and mergers in 
Hong Kong. It was approved by the Securities Commission on 
14 August 1975 and was based on the original UK Code of the 
mid-1960‘s. The Code has been constantly reviewed and 
revised, and the current version is the one amended in 
March 1988. The Code is now under revision and the next 
version will be available in early 1991. 
The Code provides the minimum acceptable guidelines 
for companies and their consultants who may involve in 
takeovers and mergers a f f e c � i n g public companies in Hong 
Kong. The Code itself does not enforced by law, it is only 
administered by the Committee on Takeovers and Mergers 
which consists members from Securities Commission, the 
Committee of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, the 
Committee on Unit Trusts, and other financial institutions. 
Success of the Code relies on the support from persons 
involved in the activities. 
/ 
31 Awanohara, Susumu, "U.S. Toughens Stance on Foreign 
Investment: Reluctant Seller." 
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The Code begins with the section Introduction and then 
Definitions in which terms are defined, followed by 
Procedure where the administration procedure of the Code is 
explained. The main parts of the Code are General 
Principles and Rules. "General Principles constitute 
acceptable standards of commercial behaviour that are used 
to govern takeovers and mergers in Hong Kong. While the 
Rules are, in some cases, examples of the application of 
the General P:rinciples, and, in other cases, rules of 
procedure designed to govern specific forms of takeover and 
merger t r a n s a c t i o n s . T h e information required in the 
offer document and the offeree company's documents is 
listed in Schedule 工 and Schedule 工工 respectively. Finally, 
Practice Notes are given which are intended to serve as a 
guide that to be read in conjunction with the particular 
sections of the Code. 
General Principles 
We are now going to examine the General Principles of 
the Code one by one. 
Principle One states that the spirit and the precise 
wording of the General Principles and the Rules should be 
observed. And "since it is impracticable to devise detailed 
rules to cover all circumstances, the spirit will apply in 
areas or circumstances not explicitly covered by any 
General Principle or Rule.” This principle points out the 
• > 
Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers, 
Introduction, paragraph two. 
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nature of the M&A activities is complicated and is not 
possible to formulate rules to cover all conditions. 
Therefore it may suggest that code is a flexible form of 
control which can be amended or extended from time to time. 
Principle Two states that "when control of a company 
changes hands, there is an obligation upon the new 
controlling shareholder(s) or their representatives to 
inform the general body of shareholders of the change as 
soon as possible." And Principle Three states that, "it is 
normally required that the new controlling shareholder(s) 
should extend to other shareholders of the same class an 
offer on terms no less attractive than the highest price 
paid for shares purchased by the controlling shareholder(s) 
within the six months prior to acquiring control, unless 
such offer is unnecessary or unreasonable.” These two 
principles are set for the good of minority shareholders, 
because they should be given the chance to sell their 
shares at reasonable price if they think their interests 
will be hurt under a change of control. 
Principle Four states that "shareholders must be given 
all the facts and opinions necessary for them to make a 
reasonable-informed judgement of an offer.“ Here, 
"shareholders" include those of the offeror and offeree 
companies. This principle protects shareholders who need 
information to make decisions on M&A transactions in order 
to secure their interests. 
Principle Five states that no action shall be taken by 
the board of the offeree company which could result in any 
45 
bona-fide offer being frustrated, while Principle Six 
states that "the boards of an offeror and of an offeree 
company. . . have a primary duty to act in the best interests 
of their respective shareholders as a whole, without regard 
to their own personal relationships with the two 
companies.“ However it may be- difficult to prove whether 
the boards are acting in their own interest or in their 
shareholders ‘ . And whether it is a sin for the boards to 
act in their own interests is questionable, particularly as 
they are the major shareholders. 
Principle Seven states that "all parties to a takeover 
or merger transaction must endeavour to prevent the 
creation of a false market in the shares of an offeror or 
offeree company," which is the fundamental requirement of 
a healthy market. 
Principle Eight states that "a board receives an offer 
or is approached with a view to an offer being made should, 
in the interests of its shareholders, seek competent 
independent advice.” Lastly, Principle Nine states that the 
"rights of control must be exercised in good faith and the 
abuse of shareholders‘ rights is wholly unacceptable.” 
These two principles again like Principles Two and Three 
are set for the protection of minority shareholders. 
Power of the Code 
The Committee on Takeovers and Mergers (the Committee) 
has the right to interpret the Takeovers Code as stated in 
the Procedure 3: 
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“...if the parties involved are in any doubt 
about the interpretation of any of the provisions 
of the Code, the Chairman is ready to give his 
views and will consult the Committee when 
advisable. Any person who, having discussed a 
. m a t t e r with the Chairman, is not satisfied with 
a ruling or recommendation may refer the matter 
to the Committee.” 
And if it appears that there is a breach of the Code, 
the Chairman may invite the concerned persons to appear 
before the Committee for a hearing. However not much the 
Committee can do even the breach of Code is confirmed: 
"Procedure 4. ...If the Committee finds that 
there has been a breach, it may have recourse to 
private reprimand or public censure or to further 
action as appropriate...“ 
In fact, the concerned persons could refuse to appear 
before the Committee for hearing. For instance, in the HK 
Hotels case, David Liang had refused to give evidences to 
the Committee. 
And it has long be argued whether a code is 
appropriate and powerful enough to control takeover and 
merger activities. Two corporate financial consultants gave 
the following commends: 
Li Kar Keung, Caspar, director of Citicorp said: 
" . . . c o d e is more flexible than law..." 
" . . . g o v e r n m e n t may not have the expertise to 
interpret the Code, while professionals who have 
the ability actually come from the industry thus 
may not give fair interpretations, problems may 
arise...“ 
" . . . i t is very difficult to prove some persons 
are acting in concert...’' 
Francis H. Jackson, director of Schroders Asia Limited 
said: ‘ 
"...code is flexible. If law is used as the mean 
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of control, precious time will be wasted when 
cases are brought before court... time is a 
dominant factor in making takeover d e a l s . . 
code is much easier to be revised to suit 
changing environment, revision of law needs long 
time and is difficult.••" 
It is argued that reputation is important in doing 
business垂 so "the penalty such as p u b l i c censuire undeir the 一 
Code is already adequate to threaten a n y o n e w h o has 
intension to breach the Code. 
Companies are also willing to comply w i t h the Code 
b e c a u s e disobey the Code may make the g o v e r n m e n t implement 
t i g h t e r control in the future. 
Main Problem with the Code 
In the Report of the Securities Review C o m m i t t e e , May 
1988, the main problem concerning the Code w a s i d e n t i f i e d 
a s the non-compliance with the requirement for a g e n e r a l 
o f f e r when a shareholdering exceeds 3 5 p e r c e n t : 
"13.8 ••• The main problem in Hong Kong a p p e a r s 
to b e non-compliance with the r e q u i r e m e n t for a 
general offer once a shareholding exceeds 3 5 % . In 
this r e s p e c t � it has been suggested t h a t the 
sanction of a public reprimand has n o t b e e n 
sufficient to enforce the Code.” 
Howev e r , the Review Committee did n o t g i v e any 
c o n c r e t e recommendation due to the unclear n a t u r e of the 
issue: 
"13.9 We are of the view that the g e n e r a l o f f e r 
requirement is fundamental to e n s u r i n g b r o a d 
equality of treatment for all s h a r e h o l d e r s . T h e 
question of whether a breach of the C o d e s h o u l d 
be made a criminal offence and the s a n c t i o n for 
such a breach is, however, v e x e d . D i f f e r e n t m a j o r 
‘markets have adopted different a p p r o a c h e s . In t h e 
time available, we have n o t c o n s i d e r e d t h e 
question in sufficient detail to m a k e d e t a i l e d 
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recommendations.“ 
• • - - - - • - � . 
Possible Future Control 
The Code of Takeovers and Mergers is the only mean of 
control of takeovers in Hong Kong. It is used to protect 
the interest of shareholders. It is realized that code is 
more flexible and more suitable than law to control 
takeovers in Hong Kong. Nonetheless, whether the Code has 
been enforced with enough power in administration, 
investigation and to give penalties remains as a question. 
It is believed that less control and free market 
benefit the economy most because of efficient resources 
utilization, but close monitoring is still necessary in 
case non-ethical transactions arise. Base on this point, 
information disclosure and power of investigation are rhe 
two factors that should be considered in the formulation of 
future control system. 
The current Code does not cover the control of 
monopolistic power generated by takeovers and mergers. 
Since consumers are affected indirectly by M&A activities, 
Securities Commission should consider introducing new rules 
in the Code, or otherwise through the use of law to protect 
consumers from monopolistic power. 
It should be the role of the Committee of Takeovers 
and Mergers to evaluate whether a takeover or merger gives 
monopolistic power to a company. And the Committee should 
be given the power to suspend or abandon the transaction. 
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CHAPTER X 
ROLE OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS & FUTURE TRENDS CONCERNING 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
Hong Kong Government 
The Hong Kong government should continue through 
Securities Commission to monitor the operations of 
takeovers and mergers. At the moment, only the shareholders 
are protected under the Code of Takeovers and Mergers, 
while it should be extended to protect the' majority 
consumers‘ interest. Monopolistic power as a result of 
takeovers and mergers should be prohibited. 
Management 
It is accused that management is distracted from 
normal business operations by M&A activities, others 
believe that some brightest guys are busy involving in 
these transactions which is in fact a waste of human 
resources. But at least for two reasons, the management 
should keep their eyes on M&A activities. 
First, management people themselves are the one who 
would most likely be affected by a change of control of 
their companies. For their own interests as well as the 
t 
shareholders‘, they have to keep their companies 
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unattractive for hostile takeovers. 
From the other perspective, besides extracting value 
created by takeovers and mergers, an acquiring firm could 
expand or diversify its business within a short period 
through M&A. For instance, to acquire one's supplier in 
order to secure material supply; to acquire" a well 
developed distributor to secure penetration of new 
products； or to acquire an existing business rather than to 
develop from internal. Hence management should constantly 
consider M&A as a kind of business strategy. 
Merchant Banks 
Since there is no active bond market in Hong Kong, 
debt issues arranged by merchant banks become the major 
mean of capital for acquiring firms to finance takeovers. 
And the demand for this kind of service is expected to 
increase in the future. 
Financial Consultants 
According to what Francis H. Jackson, director of 
Schroders Asia Limited, said, currently about 90 percent of 
the takeover deals are proposed by their clients. 
In fact, the financial consultants should play a more 
active role in identifying takeover or merger targets for 
their clients, as their clients may not have the expertise 
or time to do so. 
When asked whether political issue concerning 1997 
would affect M&A activities in Hong Kong, Francis H. 
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Jackson said that there would be less M&A transactions 
within listed companies of Hong Kong, but there would be 
more transactions connected with private companies, either 
listed company acquiring private company, or private 
company acguiiring private company. Moreover there would be 
more cross" border transactions in the future. Francis said 
that, foreign companies who had confidence in Hong Kong‘s 
future would get into the market through M&A, while those 
local companies who wanted to diversify their business in 
order to reduce political risk would invest through M&A in 
foreign countries. Nevertheless, the M&A market in Hong 
Kong would remain active in the future. 
Europe Economic Community 
Trade barriers within Europe Economic Community will 
be eliminated from 1992, and this should stiinulate mScA 
activities. At the moment, the capacity of merger and 
acquisition is not fully utilized because of the 
interference under existing statute laws. However, ten of 
the twelve member states have already shown their intension 
to formulate new control regulation that would provide a 
"one-stop shop" for community—scale m e r g e r s � . P a i n e W e b b e r ' s 
Nicholas Aylwin said that takeovers in Europe would take 
the form of agreed deals rather than hostile one^^. 
33 
Sutherland, Peter D. , "Approaching a Showdown on 
European Merger Control.” , 
34 Shegog, Andrew, "Mergers & Acquisitions: Industrial 
Logic at the Right Price." 
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Junk Bond 
Junk bond has been using as a financing tool in 
corporate takeovers in foreign countries especially in 
United States. The value of junk bonds issued increased 
from less than $US1 billion in 1982 to US$200 billion in 
December 1988. But as a result of financial problem arose 
in the biggest junk bond issuing company, the value of junk 
bonds dropped to US$170 billion in January 1989. 
As United States is in a low economic growth stage, 
leverage buy out financed by high interest rate junk bond 
becomes infeasible. It is believed that the reliance on 
junk bond as a financing tool in corporate takeovers will 
decrease, and it will be replaced by other financial 
instrument in the next few years^^. 
f 
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SUMMARY OF TENDER OFFERS 1989 
TRANSACTION PROPOSAL VALUE 
DATE (MILLION) 
1. OFFEREE IBI ASIA HOLDINGS LTD. 9/1 HK$100 
OFFEROR FIRST PACIFIC HOLDINGS LTD. 
2. OFFEREE YUE HWA CHINESE PRODUCTS 20/1 N A 
OFFEROR CARRINGTON LTD. “ 
3. OFFEREE SCILLA HOLDINGS LTD. 22/2 HK$557 
OFFEROR GOLDEN RESULT DEVELOPMENT LTD. 
4. OFFEREE JADEMAN (HOLDINGS) LTD. 27/2 LAPSED 
OFFEROR THE SPACEMAN LTD. 
5. OFFEREE SINGAPORE HONG KONG PROPERTIES INVESTMENT LTD. 9/3 - HK$111 
OFFEROR TOP BILLION INVESTMENT LTD. 
6. OFFEREE THE KWONG SANG HONG LTD. 20/3 HK$346 
OFFEROR WALDEN CORP. 
7. OFFEREE ONTRADE INTERNATIONAL LTD. 23/3 HK$80 
OFFEROR OMNI CO COMPANY INC. 
8. OFFEREE WING ON (HOLDING) LTD. 12/4 LAPSED 
OFFEROR PRIME HARBOUR LTD. 
9. OFFEREE SUN ON ESTATE COMPOANY LTD. 29/4 N A 
OFFEROR VICORP LTD. “ 
• - - - _ 
10. OFFEREE PALADIN LTD. 19/3 LAPSED 
OFFEROR LAISEE COMPANY LTD. 
11. OFFEREE THL INTERNATIONAL LTD. 29/8 HKZ2^2 
OFFEROR FORD IT LTD. 
12. OFFEREE SHUI ON GROUP LTD. 22/9 H A 
OFFEROR ZOLLER LTD • ‘ 
13. OFFEREE ROSE KNITTING CO. LTD. 5/IO HK$62 
OFFEROR HUEY TAI INVESTMENT CO. LTD. 
14. OFFEREE SUCCESS HOLDINGS LTD. 13/11 HK$18 
OFFEROR MAIN ROAD LTD. 
15. OFFEREE GOOD EARNING INVESTMENT CO. LTD. 20/11 N A 
OFFEROR CITIACT CO. LTD.. ‘“ 
16. OFFEREE SUCCESS HOLDINGS LTD. 30/11 LAPSED 
OFFEROR WONG'S INDUSTRIAL LTD. 
17. OFFEREE HALE CORPORATION LTD. 15/12 
OFFEROR HOTEL EQUITIES LTD. 
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18.OFFEREE POLLY PECK FAR EAST LTD. 18/12 
OFFEROR BRAVE DRAGON LTD. 
19. OFFEREE FIRST CITY INVESTMENTS LTD. ig/l? W W T ^ 
• OFFEROR NEW TREND LTD. 
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